The Concept of Autonomy of EU Law from the Comparative Perspective of International Law and the Legal Systems of Member States by Molnár, Tamás
21 TheConceptofAutonomyofEULawfrom
the Comparative Perspective of
InternationalLawandtheLegal Systems
of Member States
Tamás Molnár*
21.1 Introduction
It is remarkable that the notion of the ‘autonomyof EuropeanUnion (EU) law’has received,
since its inception in the 1960s, relatively little academic attention compared to other basic
EU law premises such as ‘supremacy’ or ‘direct effect’, particularly from the theoretical or
conceptual angle.1The autonomous nature of this distinct body of law is taken for granted
* Adjunct professor, Corvinus University of Budapest, Institute of International Studies. This article was
supported by the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
1 From recent EU law scholarship, however, see e.g. R. Barents,The Autonomy of Community Law, TheHague,
Kluwer Law International, 2004; S. Szurek, ‘Du particularisme à l’autonomie? Esquisse des rapports du droit
international et du droit communautaire’, 5 Annuaire de droit européen (2007), pp. 57-92; B. de Witte,
‘European Union Law: How Autonomous is its Legal Order?’, 31 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (2010),
pp. 141-155; N. Tsagourias, ‘Conceptualizing the autonomy of the European Union’ in R. Collins and N.D.
White (eds.), International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy. Institutional Independence in the
International Legal Order, Oxford, Routledge, 2011, 339-351; J. Czuczai, ‘The autonomy of the EU legal
order and the law-making activities of international organizations. Some examples regarding the Council
most recent practice’, 31 Yearbook of European Law (2012), pp. 452-472; E. Dubout, ‘La relativité de la dis-
tinction des normes du droit de l’Union européenne et du droit international’, in de L. Burgorgue-Larsen,
E.Dubout, A.Maitrot de laMotte and S. Touzé (éds.), Les interactions normatives. Droit de l’Union européenne
et droit international, Paris, Editions A. Pedone, 2012, pp. 17-51; L. Kirchmair, ‘The ‘Janus Face’ of the Court
of Justice of the European Union: A Theoretical Appraisal of the EU Legal Order’s Relationship with Inter-
national andMember State Law’, 4Goettingen Journal of International Law (2012), pp. 677-691; R.A.Wessel
and S. Blockmans, ‘Between Autonomy and Dependence: The EU Legal Order Under the Influence of
International Organisations –An Introduction’, in R.A.Wessel and S. Blockmans (eds.),Between Autonomy
and Dependence. The EU Legal Order Under The Influence of International Organisations, TheHague, T.M.C.
Asser Press/Springer, 2013, pp. 1-9; J.W. van Rossem, ‘The Autonomy of EU Law: More is Less?’, in R.A.
Wessel and S. Blockmans (eds.), Between Autonomy and Dependence. The EU Legal Order Under The
Influence of International Organisations, TheHague, T.M.C. Asser Press/Springer, 2013, pp. 13-46; I. Pernice,
‘The Autonomy of the EU Legal Order – Fifty Years After VanGend’, in A. Tizzano, J. Kokott and S. Prechal
(eds.), 50ème Anniversaire de l’arrêt/50th anniversary of the judgment in Van Gend en Loos, 1963-2013, Actes
du Colloque Luxembourg, 13 mai 2013 – conference proceedings Luxembourg, 13 May 2013, Luxembourg,
Office des publications de l’Union européenne, 2013, pp. 55-80 (http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/P_95693
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by many EU law scholars, and other related topics have rather been in the spotlight of
academic research as demonstrated by the vast legal literature dealing with the legal effects
of international law within the EU legal order2 as well as the external relations law of the
European Union.3 After Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU), delivered in December 2014,4 a new wave of scholarly writings has appeared
focusing on the autonomy of EU law, but principally in connection with the Union’s
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights; commenting and analysing the
Court’s autonomy-related arguments in this context.5 Despite being a bit in the shadow
– last accessed on 1 August 2015); P. Eckhout, ‘Human Rights and the Autonomy of EU Law – Pluralism
or Integration?’, 66 Current Legal Problems (2013), pp. 169-202.
2 See, for instance, C. Kaddous, ‘Effects of International Agreements in the EU Legal Order’, in M. Cremona
and B. de Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law – Constitutional Fundamentals, Oxford, Hart Publishing,
2008; P.J. Kuijper, ‘Customary international law, decisions of international organisations and other techniques
for ensuring the respect for international legal rules in European Community law’, in J. Wouters, A. Noll-
kaemper and E. de Wet (eds.), The Europeanisation of International Law. The Status of International Law
in the EU and its Member States, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2008; E. Cannizzaro, P. Palchetti and R.A.
Wessel (eds.), International law as law of the European Union, Boston /Leiden,Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
2011;M. Benlolo-Carabot, U. Candas andE. Cujo (éds.),Union européenne et droit international. En l’honneur
de Patrick Daillier, Paris, Editions A. Pedone, 2012;M.Mendez, The Legal Effects of EU Agreements, Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2013; R.A. Wessel, Close Encounters of the Third Kind. The Interface between the
EU and International Law after the Treaty of Lisbon (SIEPS 2013:8), Stockholm, Swedish Institute for
European Policy Studies, December 2013 (www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/2013_8_WEBB.pdf – last accessed
on 1 August 2015); or in the Hungarian legal literature M. Szabó, ‘Az európai jog és a nemzetközi jogrend
– hierarchia és összefonódás’, LIII Állam- és Jogtudomány (2012), pp. 191-211; Á. Mohay, ‘A nemzetközi
jog és az uniós jog kapcsolódási pontjai’ 1 Scriptura (2014), pp. 269-281 (http://onszak.hu/folyoirat/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/12Mohay.pdf – last accessed on 1 August 2015).
3 Almost all EU law textbooks devote a chapter to this issue, and there are many specific commentaries,
monographs or handbooks published on this topic, too (e.g. J.-V. Louis et al., Relations extérieures – Com-
mentaire J. Mégret. Le droit de la CE et de l’Union européenne, Bruxelles, Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles,
2005; P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, Oxford/Portland, Hart Publishing, 2006; M. Cremona
and B. de Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law – Constitutional Fundamentals, Oxford, Hart Publishing,
2008; P. Eckhout, EU External Relations Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011 (2nd edition); A.
Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds.), Law and Practice of EU External Relations. Salient Features of a
Changing Landscape, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011; B. van Voren and R.A. Wessel, EU
External Relations Law. Text, Cases and Materials, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014.
4 Opinion 2/13,Draft agreement providing for the accession of the European Union to the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Opinion of the Court (Full Court) of
18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.
5 Vol. 16 of the German Law Journal has devoted a special section to comment and discuss the ramifications
of the Opinion, composed of the following contributions: D. Halberstam, ‘It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!’ A
Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR, and the Way Forward’, 16 German Law
Journal (2015), pp. 105-146; Ch. Krenn, ‘Autonomy and Effectiveness as Common Concerns: A Path to
ECHR Accession After Opinion 2/13’, 16 German Law Journal (2015), pp. 147-167; S.Ø. Johansen, The
Reinterpretation of TFEUArt. 344 inOpinion 2/13 and Its Potential Consequences’, 16German Law Journal
(2015), pp. 169-178; A. Lazowski and R.A. Wessel, ‘When Caveats Turn into Locks: Opinion 2/13 on
Accession of the European Union to the ECHR’, 16 German Law Journal (2015), pp. 179-212; S. Peers, ‘The
EU’s Accession to the ECHR: The Dream Becomes a Nightmare’, 16 German Law Journal (2015), pp. 213-
222. Consider also e.g. ‘Editorial Comments’, 52 Common Market Law Review (2015), pp. 1-16; P. Eckhout,
‘Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue – Autonomy or Autarky?’ Jean Monnet
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up until recently, ‘autonomy’ is undisputedly a fundamental and structural principle of
the EU legal order since its judge-made creation, also believed to be now part of ‘the very
foundations’ of the Union legal order.6 In essence, the concept of autonomy oversteps the
traditional divide between international law and domestic law by giving birth to a new
category of law, a ‘new legal order.’ In order that a normative system be autonomous, it is
the fact not being subject to external legal norms.7 In the EU context, this line of reasoning
is taken by the CJEU as follows: ‘the very nature of EU law […] requires that relations
between Member States be governed by EU law to the exclusion […] of any other law.’8
Given the reflexive nature of the term ‘autonomy’, that is, to be self-standing/distinct from
something and to be able to function separately, it should relate to one or more points of
reference. If we assume these points of references in the formof legal orders, the autonomy
of Union law can be basically conceived in two ways: vis-à-vis either international law
(external aspect of autonomy) or the domestic legal systems of theMember States (internal
aspect of autonomy). This kind of conceptualisation clearly appears in Opinion 2/13,9 and
earlier the two dimensions of autonomy had already been identified by academia as well.10
Nevertheless, legal concepts, especially highly abstract ones, oftentimes have ‘open texture’
(using Hart’s terms), which is particularly true for the doctrine of the autonomy of EU
law. As Odermatt observed, ‘the problem is that ‘autonomy’ is a notoriously vague and ill-
defined concept and can be applied in a narrow or open fashion.’11 Therefore this corner-
stone principle is still a controversially discussed issue in EU law. In any event, the concept
of autonomy can exhibit different features which will depend on the circumstances of the
case.12
In this short piece, I will first analyse and clarify the meaning of the two dimensions of
autonomy of EU law (external and internal aspects), also discussing the latest developments
Working Paper 01/15 (http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/JMWP-01-Eeckhout1.pdf
– last accessed on 1 August 2015); or J. Odermatt, ‘A Giant Step Backwards? Opinion 2/13 on the EU’s
Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights’, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies
Working Paper No. 150 – February 2015 (https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/wp150-odermatt.pdf – last accessed
on 1 August 2015).
6 Van Rossem, 2013, p. 18; Wessel and Blockmans, 2013, p. 1.
7 M. Troper, ‘La constitution comme système juridique autonome’, 34 Droits (2002), p. 66.
8 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, Para. 40.
9 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, Para. 170 (‘The autonomy enjoyed by EU law in relation to the laws of the Member
States and in relation to international law…’). Advocate General Kokott equally made this distinction in her
View delivered on 13 June 2014, when she opined that ‘autonomy is not only characteristic of the relationship
between EU law and the laws of the Member States, but must be respected also vis-à-vis third countries and
international organisations’ (ECLI:EU:C:2014:2475, Para. 159).
10 See e.g. J-C. Gautron and L. Grard, ‘Rapport général: Le droit international dans la construction de l’Union
européenne.’ in SFDI,Colloque de Bordeaux. Droit international et droit communautaire, perspectives actuelles,
Paris, Editions A. Pedone, 2000, p. 22; de Witte, 2010, p. 142; Tsagourias, 2011, p. 339-40; Kirchmair, 2012,
pp. 678-679; Pernice, 2013, p. 57; Wessel and Blockmans, 2013, p. 1.
11 Odermatt, 2015, p. 12.
12 Van Rossem, 2013, p. 18.
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in this respect, i.e. its apparently stronger constitutional role in EUpublic law architecture.
In view of the limited length of this article, I will not dwell uponOpinion 2/13 in a detailed
and in-depth manner, but I will only touch it upon to a necessary extent and to illustrate
the evolution of the concept of autonomy against the backdrop of the CJEU’s previous
jurisprudence. Subsequently, the paper will compare the different needs and challenges for
preserving the autonomy of the EU legal order from international law and the legal systems
of the Member States. In doing so, the theoretical prerequisites of any ‘legal order’,
including its autonomous regime of validity and its mechanism guaranteeing the unity of
interpretation, will be shortly studied as well. Finally, after comparing the methods and
requirements to protect the external and internal dimensions of the claimed autonomy, I
will conclude that the fully-fledged autonomy of the EU legal order is more dependent on
its relation to the national legal orders (which is factual and concrete) than to general
international law (which is, to a large extent, principally conceptual).
21.2 External and Internal Aspects of the Autonomy of EU Law
1. As a starting point, the concept of autonomy is traditionally perceived in the context of
international law as the famous judgments of the CJEU in Van Gend en Loos13 and Costa
v. E.N.E.L.,14 followed by other less-known cases in the 1960s,15 have elaborated the doctrine
in this respect. Positioning EU law in relation to international law as an initial step in this
process is not surprising. The European regional economic – and nowpolitical – integration
organization, whether it is called European (Economic) Communities or EuropeanUnion,
has always been and is still based on international treaties. As a result, the very existence
and the general framework (including its modification regime) of this inter-governmental
organization has been clearly rooted in international law.16 The CJEU, famous for its
judicial activism, had first pronounced in the Van Gend en Loos judgement that the
‘Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which
Member States have limited their sovereign rights’17 (emphasis added – T.M.), which was
13 Case 26-62, NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland
Revenue Administration, Judgment of the Court of 5 February 1963, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1.
14 Case 6-64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L, Judgment of the Court of 15 July 1964, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66.
15 For instance, Joined Cases 90-63 and 91-63, Commission of the European Economic Community v. Grand
Duchy of Luxembourg and Kingdom of Belgium, Judgment of the Court of 13 November 1964,
ECLI:EU:C:1964:80.
16 Similarly, see e.g. de Witte, 2010, pp. 141-155.
17 ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, Part II.B, Para. 4. In the original, French version of the text (at that time, the United
Kingdomwas not amongst the members of the European Economic Community (EEC), so English was not
an official language of the EEC) it reads as follows: ‘un nouvel ordre juridique de droit international au profit
duquel les Etats membres ont limité leur pouvoirs souverains’.
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later simply referred to as a ‘new legal order’18 and the mention of international law as its
broader normative system of operation disappeared. These magic words have been then
used slightly differently in Costa v. E.N.E.L. when the Luxembourg Court added that ‘by
contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EECTreaty has created its own legal system’
(emphasis added – T.M).19 It also pinpointed that EU law arose out of an ‘independent
source of law’, which is not a fully accurate translation of the expression in the French
original (‘issu d’une source autonome’).20 It is true that the Van Gend en Loos and Costa v.
E.N.E.L. rulings can be convincingly interpreted as relating to both the external and
internal aspects of autonomy. In my understanding, though, there is a logical sequence
between the two dimensions as they appear in the above decisions. First, the judges in
Luxembourg had to emancipate EU law from international law. Only after preparing the
ground such a way the CJEU could effectively argue that Member States are obliged to
accept, within their own legal systems, the autonomous nature and operation of this body
of law emanating from the founding Treaties (by means of direct effect, supremacy, pre-
emption etc.). ‘To make certain key principles of EU law (including ‘primacy’ and ‘direct
effect’) work, the EU needs to stress its autonomous relation vis-à-vis international law’ –
argued similarlyWessel.21Put it differently, if EU law is construed by theCourt as something
completely different and independent from international law, representing a wholly new
category of law, then Member States cannot apply their ordinary legal techniques and
arguments developed for the domestic reception of norms originating from international
law when it comes to enforcing EU law in the national legal systems, including the legal
effects they produce internally. Consequently I refer to these two hallmark judgments
18 Joined Cases 90-63 and 91-63, Commission of the European Economic Community v. Grand Duchy of Lux-
embourg and Kingdom of Belgium, Judgment of the Court of 13 November 1964, ECLI:EU:C:1964:80, p.
1232 (‘the [EEC] Treaty […] establishes a new legal order’ or in the French original ‘un ordre juridique
nouveau’). Not only was the expression of ‘international law’ omitted by the Court, but even the order of
words has been changed compared to the Van Gend en Loos formula; then this shorter version was later
echoedmany times in subsequent jurisprudence, e.g. inOpinion 1/91,Draft Agreement relating to the Creation
of the European Economic Area, Opinion of the Court of 14 December 1991, ECLI:EU:C:1991:490. In Costa
v. E.N.E.L, a slightly different formulation was used in the original French version to refer to this sui generis
legal order, namely ‘ordre juridique propre’, which was translated in English as ‘its own legal system’ when
English became an official language of the EEC.
19 ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, Para. 12. The original French version of the judgment applies the term ‘un ordre juridique
propre’. For subsequent jurisprudence, see also Joined Cases 142/80 and 143/80, Amministrazione delle
Finanze dello Stato v. Essevi SpA and Carlo Salengo, Judgment of the Court of 27 May 1981,
ECLI:EU:C:1981:121, Para. 8 (‘Above all, it must be pointed out that in no circumstances may the Member
States rely on similar infringements by other Member States in order to escape their own obligations under
the provisions of the Treaty.’).
20 This ‘lost in translation’ phenomenon is also noticed by deWitte, 2010, p. 142. Other commentators do not
consider it problematic; see P. Pescatore, ‘Van Gend en Loos, 3 February 1963 – A View from Within’, in
M.P. Maduro and L. Azulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law. The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the
50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 5; Pernice, 2013, p. 56.
21 Wessel, 2013, p. 22.
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throughout this subsection as predominantly (but not exclusively) articulating the external
dimension of the autonomy of EU law.
It flows from the above analysis that the ground-breaking judgments in the 1960s,
traditionally associated with the genesis of the doctrine of autonomy, had not expressly
used this phrasing. The term ‘autonomy of the Community legal order’ was initially and
explicitly applied by the Court in itsOpinion 1/9122 and then subsequently echoed in other
Opinions23 as well as reiterated in ulterior landmark judgments, notably in MOX Plant,24
then in the Kadi I ruling.25 In these two judgments, the Court revitalized the external
dimension of this notion by stating that ‘an international agreement cannot affect the
allocation of responsibilities defined in the Treaties, and consequently, the autonomy of
the Community legal system’26 and strongly emphasised the ‘autonomous legal order of
the Community’,27 which is not to be prejudiced by international law. Lately, the CJEU
has reaffirmed with particular vigour the importance of autonomy as a fundamental con-
stitutional principle of EU law in its Opinion 2/13 relating to the compatibility with EU
law of the agreement for the accession of the EuropeanUnion to the EuropeanConvention
onHuman Rights (ECHR). Here, after the restatement of the classics,28 the Court went on
giving an implicit definition of this controversial notion. It encapsulated themain features
and building blocks of the autonomous nature of the EU legal order by specifying that ‘the
EU has a new kind of legal order, the nature of which is peculiar to the EU, its own consti-
tutional framework and founding principles, a particularly sophisticated institutional
structure and a full set of legal rules to ensure its operation.’29 In the present state of affairs,
the EUCourt understands autonomy in away that the EuropeanUnionmay be a construc-
tion of international law, but in its internal legal order its own rules replace the principles
22 ECLI:EU:C:1991:490, Paras. 30, 35 and 47.
23 Opinion 1/92, Draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European
Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic Area, Opinion of the
Court of 10 April 1992, ECLI:EU:C:1992:189, Paras. 17-18, 22, 24, 29, 36; Opinion 1/00, Proposed agreement
between the European Community and non-Member States on the establishment of a European Common
Aviation Area, Opinion of the Court of 22 April 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:231, Paras. 5-6, 12, 21, 26-27, 37,
46; Opinion 1/09,Draft agreement –Creation of a unified patent litigation system – European and Community
Patents Court, Opinion of the Court (Full Court) of 8 March 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:123, Paras. 67, 76.
24 Case C-459/03, Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland (MOX Plant), Judgment of the Court
(Grand Chamber) of 30 May 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:345.
25 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation
v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, Judgment of the Court
(Grand Chamber) of 3 September 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461. For an overview of the Kadi saga, with rich
bibliographical references, see C. Feinäugle, ‘Kadi Case’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia
of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 2008-, online edition (www.opil.ouplaw.com – article
last updated: April 2014).
26 ECLI:EU:C:2006:345, Para. 123, then repeated in Kadi I (ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, Para. 282).
27 ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, Para. 317.
28 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, Para. 157.
29 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, Para. 158.
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and mechanisms of international law.30 Further to that, in case of norm conflicts between
its internal rules (acquis communautaire) andundertaken external obligations (international
law binding the EU), primary EU law is given priority over conflicting international
agreements and other international obligations. Some of these collision rules are laid down
in the founding Treaties,31 some others have been developed by the European Court of
Justice (with regard to certain general principles of EU law).32
Borrowing van Rossem’s words, the preservation of the ‘external autonomy’ of EU law
has been understood by the CJEU, as voiced e.g. in its Opinions 1/91, 1/92 and 1/00,33 to
require two things:
[f]irst, that the essential character of the powers of the [EU] and its institutions
remains unaltered by an international agreement. Secondly, that procedures
for ensuring uniform interpretation of treaties, specifically procedures that
involve an external judicial body, do not have the effect of binding the EU and
its institutions, in the exercise of their internal powers, to a particular interpre-
tation of the rules of EU law.34
The external dimension of the autonomy of EU law thus indicates its emancipation from
international law; therefore it applies in relation to third States and international organisa-
tions and the whole body of general international law as such. The EUCourt left no doubt
about this separationwhen postulated: ‘Security Council resolutions andCouncil common
positions and regulations originate from distinct legal orders.’35 Nevertheless, the
autonomous existence of EU law does not mean that ‘the Community’s municipal legal
30 Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice on Access of the EU to the ECHR – One Step ahead and Two Steps Back.
Blog entry of 31 March 2015 on http://europeanlawblog.eu (last accessed on 1 August 2015).
31 Arts. 216(2), 218(11) and 351 TFEU.
32 Case C-122/95, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of the Court of
10March 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:94; CaseC-162/96,A. Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, Judgment
of the Court of 16 June 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:293; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin
Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission
of the European Communities, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 3 September 2008,
ECLI:EU:C:2008:461.
33 For the original appearance of these requirements see ECLI:EU:C:1991:490, Paras. 35, 39-42; afterwards
echoed in subsequent opinions (ECLI:EU:C:1992:189, Paras. 17-22, 32, 41; ECLI:EU:C:2002:231, Paras. 11-
13).
34 J. W. van Rossem, ‘The EU at crossroads: a constitutional inquiry into the way international law is received
within the EU legal order’ in E. Cannizzaro, P. Palchetti and R.A. Wessel (eds.), International law as law of
the European Union, Boston/Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, p. 61. See also: R.A. Wessel and S.
Blockmans, 2013, pp. 8-9.
35 Case C-548/09, Bank Melli Iran v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber)
of 16 November 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:735, Para. 100. In legal literature, see also Kirchmair, 2012, pp. 678-
679.
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order and the international legal order pass by each other like ships in the night.’36 The
latter has definitely its place and role in the EU normative framework, likewise in national
legal orders which accommodate international legal norms pursuant to their own consti-
tutional requirements. But theoretically anddogmatically speakingEU law and international
law are treated by the Court of Justice as forming two independent and parallel legal orders.
Surely, a purely conceptual notion of autonomy as has been elaborated by the CJEU is
not enough in itself. It cannot exist in isolation, thus its embeddedness and concretisation
in social reality is needed, too.37The claimed autonomy of EU lawwas not only emphasised
and advocated by EU lawyers, butmany international law scholars have also examined EU
law’s specific, autonomous character whether it qualifies or not as a ‘self-contained regime’
(as its best or closest example).38 Yet, it is still disputed amongst legal scholars whether we
can talk about an absolute (fully-fledged self-contained regime-like) or relative autonomy
(EU law still keeping its umbilical ties with international law as one of its highly specialized
sub-system).39 Beyond academia, certain external actors in international law, notably
international judicial bodies and international organisations have also recognized this self-
proclaimed autonomy of EU law. The approach taken by the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR),40 or some arbitral tribunals41 illustrates it well. Similarly, this position is
36 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro delivered on 16 January 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:11, Para. 22.
37 See also, Dubout, 2012, p. 26.
38 See e.g. M. Sørensen, ‘Autonomous Legal Orders: Some Considerations Relating to a Systems Analysis of
International Organisations in the World Legal Order’ 32 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
(1983), pp. 559-576; B. Simma, ‘Self-Contained Regimes’, XVI Netherlands Yearbook of International Law
(1985), pp. 111-136; J.H.H.Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, 100 Yale Law Journal (1991), pp. 2403-
2484; G. Conway, ‘Breaches of EC Law and the International Responsibility ofMember States’, 13 European
Journal of International Law (2002), pp. 679-695; B. Simma andD. Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe:
Self-contained Regimes in International Law’, 17 European Journal of International Law (2006), pp. 483-
529; A. Rosas, ‘Relations entre les Etats membres de l’Union européenne: le droit international public y a-t-
il encore sa place?’, in L’Etat souverain dans le monde d’aujourd’hui. Mélanges en l’honneur de J.-P. Puissochet,
Paris, Éditions A. Pedone, 2008, pp. 255-265. E. Klein, 'Self-Contained Regime', in R. Wolfrum (ed.), The
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 2008, online edition
(www.opil.ouplaw.com – article last updated: November 2006), Paras. 3, 15.
39 Similarly, see deWitte, 2010, p. 142 or the International LawCommission’s 2006 report on the fragmentation
of international law (Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law commission, Finalized
by Marti Koskenniemi, UN Document A/CN 4/L 682, 13 April 2006, Paras. 8, 157, 218-219). Weiler and
Haltern draw the attention to that fact that leading international law periodicals such as the American
Journal of International Law or the European Journal of International Law do not consider, as a matter of
principle, the law of the European Union as international law (J.H.H. Weiler and U.R. Haltern, ‘Autonomy
of the Community Legal Order –Through the Looking Glass’ 37 Harvard International Law Journal (1996),
pp. 421-422).
40 Mousaquim v. Belgium (Appl. No. 12313/86), Judgment of 18 February 1991, Para. 49; where EU law is
referred to as a ‘special legal order’. See also this approach in Matthews v. United Kingdom (Appl. No.
24833/94), Judgement of 18 February 1999.
41 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Belgium/Netherlands (‘Iron Rhine Arbitration’), Award of the Arbitral
Tribunal of 24 May 2005, Paras. 101-103, where the Arbitral Tribunal recognized the EU’s special judicial
system, including the adjudicative autonomy of the CJEU; or Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Art.
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reflected in the practice of the Council of Europe (CoE) with the so-called ‘disconnection
clauses’ used in many CoE conventions in order not to hinder EU legislative autonomy,42
followed by other international organisations for agreements drafted under their aegis.43
Moreover, the legal solution adopted by the World Trade Organization (WTO), where
the EU as a distinct entity – a regional economic integration organization forming a ‘single
customs union’ – was admitted as a full WTO member since 1995,44 shows this kind of
recognition of the separateness of EU law from international law in the eyes of certain
actors within the international legal sphere.
2. Secondly, the internal aspect of autonomy denotes the independence of European
Union law from the national legal systems of the Member States. This inward-looking
internal dimension is characterised principally by EU law self-integrating character into
the national legal orders, and classic doctrines crystallized in the case law of the EU Court
such as direct effect, supremacy or effet utile, coupled the CJEU’s monopoly of authentic
interpretation of Union law, preventing national judicial organs to do so. Already the
earlier findings of the then Court of Justice of the European Communities in 1963 made
it clear – in line with the views expressed byAdvocate General LaGrange in previous cases45
287, andArt. 1 ofAnn.VII, ofUNCLOS for theDisputeConcerning theMOXPlant, InternationalMovements
of Radioactive Materials, and the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Irish Sea, Ireland v. United
Kingdom (The MOX Plant case), Order No. 3 of 24 June 2003, Para. 24: ‘[t]he Tribunal recognizes that the
problems […] relate to matters which essentially concern the internal operation of a separate legal order
(namely the legal order of the European Communities).’ It should be noted, though, that the practice of
arbitration tribunals varies and the picture is much more complex, with opposing standpoints from an ad
hoc tribunal to another. This oscillation is well illustrated with a recent decision of an ICSID panel, which
has plainly qualified EU law as part and parcel of international law (Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision of 30 November 2012).
42 For a comprehensive account of this practice, with numerous examples, see Council of Europe, Committee
ofMinisters, Doc. CM(2008)164, 1044Meeting, 10December 2008, point 10 LegalQuestions, 10.6Committee
of Legal Advisers on Public International Law (CAHDI) c. Report on the consequences of the so-called ‘dis-
connection clause’ in international law in general and for the Council of Europe Conventions, containing such
a clause in particular. For more academic analysis, see e.g. A.G. Kolliopoulos and C.P. Economides, ‘La
clause de déconnexion en faveur du droit communautaire: une pratique critiquable’ CX Revue Générale de
Droit International Public (2006), pp. 273-302;M. Ličková, ‘European Exceptionalism in International Law’,
19 European Journal of International Law (2008), pp. 463-490 ; M. Cremona, ‘Disconnection Clauses in EC
Law and Practice’ in Ch. Hillion and P. Koutrakos (eds.), Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and its
Member States in the World, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010, pp. 160-186.
43 For instance, the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) drafted a Protocol on Civil Liability for
Damage Caused by the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters, or the
Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF), both containing such disconnection clauses.
44 See, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm (last accessed on
1 August 2015).
45 E.g. Case 8-55, Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity, Opinion of Advocate General LaGrange of 12 June 1956, [1954-1956] ECR 261: ‘[A]lthough the
Treaty, which the Court has the task of applying was concluded in the form of an international agreement
and although it unquestionably is one, it is nevertheless, from a material point of view, the charter of the
Community, since the rules of law which derive from it constitute the internal law of that Community.’
(emphasis added – T.M.).
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– that ‘themunicipal law of anyMember State andCommunity law constitute two separate
and distinct legal orders.’46 This plainly excludes that then EC law could be considered to
be part of national law, and underlines its special character. Afterwards, both the afore-
quotedVan Gend en Loos andCosta v. E.N.E.L. rulings had a powerful say on the relation-
ship between EU legal order and the domestic legal systems of theMember States, stressing
their independence from each other. In the former, the Luxembourg Court opined that
‘independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law […] is also intended
to confer upon [individuals] rights which become part of their legal heritage.’47 In the latter,
it was held that ‘the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system which, on the entry into
force of the Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States’,48
then it added: ‘the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could
not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions
[…] without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis
of the Community itself being called into question.’49
Here, the famous formula of ‘independent source of law’ (issu d’une source autonome),
which was already discussed above in relation to the external dimension of autonomy, not
only relates to international law, but expresses EU law’s claim for autonomy vis-à-vis
national law, too. It thus means that Union law is not dependent on Member States’ legal
orders for its validity50 and application at the domestic level, but EU law is valid and
applicable in the territory of the Member States by virtue of this legal order alone. The
wording in Costa v. E.N.E.L. made it clear that the concept of autonomy, implicitly
appearing in the text, is to protect and preserve EU law from the possibility that domestic
legislative measures adopted by Member States might adversely affect it.
46 Case 13-61, Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert Bosch GmbH and Maatschappij tot
voortzetting van de zaken der Firma Willem van Rijn, Judgment of the Court of 6 April 1962,
ECLI:EU:C:1962:11.
47 ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, Part II.B, Para. 4.
48 ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, Para. 12.
49 ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, Para. 17.
50 This is entirely true for secondary EU law (acts of the Institutions). Concerning primary EU law (the
founding Treaties and their amendments) the national acts of ratifications are the sources of validity both
on the international plane and within Member State law, too. Nonetheless, if a Member State which follows
a dualist-transformation technique for incorporating treaties has expressed its consent to be bound by the
founding Treaties or their amendments (act of ratification is received by the depository), but fails to comply
with its own constitutional requirements when doing so (e.g. the act of ratification is deposited by the Head
of State without the authorization of the Parliament; or the validly ratified primary EU law, for some reason,
is not promulgated in a piece of legislation), these deficiencies will not affect the domestic validity of the
founding Treaties (Art. 46 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties can hardly be invoked
to invalidate the treaty in respect of that Member State). In other words, in such a case direct effect and
supremacy of primary EU law provisions as well as the validity of secondary EU legislation cannot be chal-
lenged internally and national courts and authorities are bound, by EU law itself, to apply the rules of Union
law.
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Overall, in my view, the references in these two leading cases visibly underpin that
direct effect and supremacy logically stem from the broader concept of autonomy of EU
law, and not the other way round. That is to say these two fundamental constitutional
pillars of the EU legal order are conceptual derivations of its autonomous character.51 The
basic rationale behind the internal aspect of the autonomy is different from that in case of
its external dimension.With regard to international law, the EuropeanUnion, and especially
the CJEU, wants to remain in full control of the interpretation and application of EU legal
norms as well as to make sure that international legal norms are not ‘allowed to make
serious inroads into the rule of law underpinning the Treaties.’52 When it comes to
autonomy vis-à-vis the legal systems of theMember States, the mainmotive is to keep and
to protect the unity of the EU legal order and to avoid distortions and divergent application
of Union law at the national level, in 28 different jurisdictions (need for uniformity).
3.Nowadays, autonomyhas been construed as a legal concept of constitutional character,
as expressed in newer CJEU case law, with the flagship judgments in the MOX Plant or
Kadi I cases and most recently and overtly in Opinion 2/13. In MOX Plant, the Court
stressed again that ‘an international agreement cannot affect the allocation of responsibil-
ities defined in the Treaties, and consequently, the autonomy of the Community legal
system.’53 In addition to that, in the first judgment rendered by the CJEU in Kadi, which
repeated the above passage from MOX Plant, it also was argued that ‘the review by the
Court of the validity of any Community measure […] must be considered to be the
expression […] of a constitutional guarantee stemming from the EC Treaty as an
autonomous legal system.’54 Similarly, the resurfaced and seemingly stronger constitutional
concept of autonomy represented the centre of gravity in the EU Court’s reasoning in its
Opinion 2/13. The Opinion devoted a sub-section to ‘the specific characteristics and
autonomy of EU law’,55 which summarized the previous case law on the meaning and
content of autonomy. The Court further held that ‘characteristics relating to the constitu-
tional structure of the EU’ also include ‘specific characteristics arising from the very nature
of EU law[, in] particular […] EU law is characterised by the fact that it stems from an
independent source of law.’56 The elevation of the concept of autonomy to the level of the
Union’s constitutional foundations explains specifically that ‘[t]he autonomy enjoyed by
EU law in relation to the laws of the Member States and in relation to international law
requires that the interpretation of […] fundamental rights be ensuredwithin the framework
of the structure and objectives of the EU.’57
51 This is also argued by Dubout, 2012, p. 27 and van Rossem, 2013, p. 18.
52 Van Rossem, 2013, p. 19; referring to the dictum in Kadi I.
53 ECLI:EU:C:2006:345, Para. 123.
54 ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, Para. 316.
55 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, Paras. 179-200.
56 Ibid., Para 166.
57 Ibid., Para. 170.
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Stressing the autonomy of the EU legal order in this context can also be seen, as some
scholars argue (e.g. van Rossem,58 Koskenniemi59 or Burgorgue-Larsen60) as a disguised
claim to sovereignty. In other words, the EU ‘envies’ its Member States in this respect, and
autonomy for the EU legal order would be something axiomatic like sovereignty for the
national legal systems. Along those lines, one can grasp EU law as ‘a municipal legal order
of trans-national dimensions’ which description appeared in an opinion of Advocate
General Maduro,61 and then it was apparently endorsed by the CJEU.
4. Against this backdrop, it is clear that there is a strong connection between the
external and internal aspects of autonomy.Nevertheless a parallel and reflective examination
of the content and ramifications of these two dimensions is still quite a terra incognita in
academic research and scholarly writings. In the next section, I am going to examine the
different needs and challenges for recognizing the autonomous nature of EU law when this
special and original legal order tries to distinguish itself from international law and the
domestic legal systems of the Member States.
21.3 Recognizing the Autonomy of EU Law vis-à-vis International Law
and the National Legal Systems: Different Needs, Challenges and
Answers
21.3.1 Theoretical Prerequisites of a ‘Legal Order’
1.When discussing the autonomy of EU law from the perspective of the international and
the domestic legal orders, a preliminary issue of what is a ‘legal order’ arises. Historically
speaking, the appearance of the idea of a legal order is a fairly recent one. As Pierre-Marie
Dupuy points it out, the first commentators to invoke this idea emerged in the study of
German public law in the first half of the 19th century, who were the successors of the
political philosophy of Kant, Hegel and Schelling. The concept of legal order (Rechtsord-
nung) used to develop in tandem with the theory of rule of law (Rechtsstaat), with which
it is frequently associated, and it referred to the idea of an organic and structural normative
58 Van Rossem, 2013, pp. 25-27.
59 M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Law: Constitutionalism, Managerialism and the Ethos of Legal Education’,
1 European Journal of Legal Studies, (2007), p. 1 (www.eljs.eu – last accessed on 1 August 2015).
60 L. Burgorgue-Larsen, ‘Existe-t-il une approche européenne du droit international?’, in SFDI, Journée franco-
allemande. Droit international et diversité des cultures juridiques, Paris, Editions A. Pedone, 2008, p. 263
(‘[l’autonomie serait] à l’ordre juridique communautaire ce qu’est la souveraineté pour les ordres juridiques
nationaux’).
61 Opinion of Advocate General Poires Maduro delivered on 16 January 2008 in Case C-402/05 P, Yassin
Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities,
ECLI:EU:C:2008:11, Para. 21.
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whole.62 The use of the term ‘legal order’ appears to be fairly technical, yet, it also has a
metaphorical role as described by Timsit.63 The notion of legal order is a representation
seeking to conceive the functioning of law.64 There is extremely abundant legal literature65
on the meaning of the term ‘legal order’, so here it suffices to briefly highlight common
elements identified in scholarly writings. These elements encompass, inter alia, the
autonomous regime of validity; own sources of law; self-referential nature; and specific
mechanisms guaranteeing the unity of interpretation of the rules belonging to the system.
On the basis of those distinctive features, one can define a ‘legal order’ as an organized
body of legal norms along a certain logic and structural principles, more than just a con-
glomerate of legal rules, and governing the concrete, real functioning of social, economic
etc. relations and interactions, so its impact on social reality (its effectiveness) matters,
too. Pierre-Marie Dupuy also concludes that although conceptions of a legal order vary
significantly between authors, all agree that the expression refers to the organisation of a
more or less complex system of norms and institutions intended effectively to apply to the
constitutive subjects of a determined community.66 In other words, it is not only a ‘bric-à-
brac’,67 but a structured, deliberately built-up system.Moreover, its self-referential character
is to be red-flagged as well, since through this feature a legal order is able to maintain its
unity and its own existence.68
2. Regarding the EU’s self-perception concerning its own legal framework, it was as
early as its first preliminary ruling the CJEU described Community law as a ‘legal order.’69
The Court did not dig deep in explaining which mechanisms are required so that a legal
order emerges and what the belonging of norms to a given system of law means, it just
plainly stated that the law stemming from the Treaties and that made by the Community
institutions qualify as a legal order. The original version of the 1957 Treaty establishing
the European Economic Community (TEEC) had not contained such a reference to the
‘Community legal order’, but due to subsequent treaty modifications, this expression was
later inserted inArticle 227 TEEC in connectionwith the situation of the outermost regions
(Art. 299 as renumbered by the Treaty of Amsterdam). In the present state of affairs, a
62 P.M. Dupuy, ‘A Doctrinal Debate in the Globalisation Era: On the ‘Fragmentation’ of International Law’ 1
European Journal of Legal Studies, (2007), p. 1 (www.eljs.eu – last accessed on 1 August 2015).
63 G. Timsit, ‘L’ordre juridique comme métaphore’, 33 Droits (2001), pp. 3-18.
64 Dubout, 2012, p. 24.
65 For a good summary of the relevant scholarly writings, see e.g. Barents, 2004, p. 170-171 (footnotes 19-20).
66 P.M. Dupuy, Droit international public, Paris, Précis Dalloz, 8th ed, 2006, Paras. 15-27.
67 This term was used by Jean Combacau in relation to international law when he assessed whether the law of
nations is a genuine system or just a random aggregation of norms of international origin (J. Combacau, ‘Le
droit international: bric-à-brac ou système’ 31 Archives de philosophie du droit (1986), pp. 88-105).
68 Barents, 2004, p. 171.
69 Case 13-61, Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert Bosch GmbH and Maatschappij tot
voortzetting van de zaken der Firma Willem van Rijn, Judgment of the Court of 6 April 1962,
ECLI:EU:C:1962:11.
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reference to the ‘Union legal order’ can be found inArticle 349 of Treaty on the functioning
of the European Union (TFEU),70 thereby continuously providing a solid positive law
foundation of the term. If we take it for granted that EU law constitutes a legal order, it
means that it cannot be subject to other external legal orders, thus it is self-standing and
the source of validity of its rules (at least as concerns secondary EU law) can be found
within this specific normative system (self-referential character). In the subsequent sub-
section, I will explore what kinds of requirements have been elaborated either by the EU
legislator or the Court of Justice to make real this claim for being an autonomous legal
order.
21.3.2 Legal Techniques and Requirements to Preserve the Autonomy of EU
Law from International Law
After having outlined above the meaning and content of the external dimension of
autonomy, now it is needed to elaborate more on those legal techniques and requirements
which are indispensable to preserve the autonomous character and functioning of EU law
from international law. Considering that the concept of (external) autonomy has never
beenmentioned in EU primary law, the case law of the CJEU gives us themost indications
in this regard.
1. However, it is still worth beginning with black letter law, because there are some
essential provisions in the founding Treaties which serve to protect the specificity and
integrity of the EU legal order, mainly from external influences. Article 344 TFEU is such
a clause, which enshrines the exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction of the EU Court in
the following terms:
‘Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for
therein.’
This essential principle and self-limitation forMember States relating to their external
action, had been recalled by the Court decades ago (for instance in Opinion 1/91),71which
is also understood since the MOX Plant case as a specific expression of Member States’
duty of sincere cooperation (loyalty) enshrined inArticle 4(3) of the Treaty on the European
Union (TEU).72 It flows from the Luxembourg jurisprudence that dispute settlement pro-
cedures involving an external judicial body (e.g. the Court of the European EconomicArea,
the WTO Dispute Settlement Bodies, or the European Court of Human Rights) shall not
70 ‘The Council shall adopt measures […] without undermining the integrity and the coherence of the Union
legal order…’ (emphasis added – T.M.).
71 See also e.g. Gautron and Grard, 2000, p. 24.
72 ECLI:EU:C:2006:345, Para. 169.
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affect the powers of CJEU and the uniform, authentic interpretation of EU law. Van Rossem
characterized it as the ‘European legal order possessed an inner core – in particular the
EC’s unique judicial structure – that, save for treaty amendment, could not be touched by
international law.’73 Besides MOX Plant, which is the previous leading case in the regard,
the freshest and very flagrant expression of this requirement has surfaced in Opinion 2/13,
where the Court examined the ramifications of Article 344 TFEU and shed more light on
the boundaries between lawful and unlawful external judicial control over EU law by an
international court. As amatter of principle, it was set out that an international agreement
cannot affect the autonomy of the EU legal system and the respective powers of the Court,
a principle enshrined inArticle 344TFEU.This provision is specifically intended to preserve
the exclusive nature of the procedure for settling those disputes within the EU, and in
particular of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in that respect, and thus precludes any
prior or subsequent external control.74 However, the EU Court also restated its previous
dictum that the creation of an external judicial body whose decisions are binding on the
EU institutions, including the Court of Justice, is not, in principle, incompatible with EU
law;75 that is particularly the case where the conclusion of such an agreement is provided
for by the Treaties themselves (see Art. 6(2) TEU laying down the obligation of the EU to
accede to the ECHR).76 If one takes a closer look at the evolution of this case law, it can be
observed that originally, Article 344 TFEUhas just beenmentioned en passant in the CJEU
autonomy-related pronouncements (e.g. inOpinion 1/91). The shift was brought byMOX
Plant, which not only reaffirmed it as a manifestation of the autonomous nature of EU
law, but discussed it more at length. By virtue of the judgment, given that the treaty at
hand, theUnitedNationsConvention on the Lawof the Sea (UNCLOS)77makes it possible
that the dispute resolution system under EU law takes precedence over the system estab-
lished by Part XV of UNCLOS, the breach of the EU Court’s exclusive jurisdiction under
Article 344 TFEU is avoided.78 In other words, here the threshold for complying with
Article 344 TFEU is the possibility of Member State compliance.79However, the CJEUopted
for a different reasoning in relation to another mixed agreement setting up an inter-party
dispute settlement mechanism in Opinion 2/13 by putting the bar of compliance higher.
The Court declared that the very existence of a possibility to bring inter-States disputes
73 Van Rossem, 2013, p. 16.
74 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, Para. 210.
75 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, Para. 182; previously see inOpinion 1/91, EU:C:1991:490, Paras. 40, 70, andOpinion
1/09, EU:C:2011:123, Para. 74.
76 ‘The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties.’
77 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed on 10 December 1982 in Montego Bay, UNTS No.
31263, Vol. 1883, p. 3 (entered into force on 16 November 1994).
78 ECLI:EU:C:2006:345, Para. 124-125.
79 Johansen, 2015, p. 174.
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before the Strasbourg Court is liable in itself to undermine the objective of Article 344
TFEU80 and goes against the very nature of EU law.81 Consequently, ‘only the express
exclusion of the ECtHR’s jurisdiction […] over disputes between the Member States or
between the Member States and the EU in relation to the application of the ECHR within
the scope ratione materiae of EU law would be compatible with Article 344 TFEU.’82 As a
result, the Court of Justice set a stricter limitation, clearly at odds with its earlier position
in MOX Plant, whereby the Member States cannot even be given a theoretical possibility
of breaching the Treaty article laying down the exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction of
the CJEU.83
2. Similarly, Article 351 TFEU embodies a further important guarantee in order to
shield the autonomous legal order of the Union from international law, mainly from
external treaty obligations. According to this provision,
[t]he rights and obligations arising fromagreements concluded before 1 January
1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, between one or
more Member States on the one hand, and one or more third countries on the
other, shall not be affected by the provisions of the Treaties.
To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with the Treaties, the
Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate
the incompatibilities established. Member States shall, where necessary, assist
each other to this end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a common attitude.
In applying the agreements referred to in the first paragraph, Member States
shall take into account the fact that the advantages accorded under the Treaties
by each Member State form an integral part of the establishment of the Union
and are thereby inseparably linked with the creation of common institutions,
the conferring of powers upon them and the granting of the same advantages
by all the other Member States. (emphasis added – T.M)
The rationale behind this conflict rule is twofold.84On the one hand, it represents an escape
clause for some pre-Community/Union international agreements concluded by Member
States with third parties. In this sense, Article 351 TFEU protects third States’ reliance
interests that their agreements with EUMember States can stand, from the perspective of
80 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, Para. 208.
81 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, Paras. 207, 212-124. For a detailed summary of the Opinion, see Á. Mohay, ‘Back to
the Drawing Board? Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice on the Accession of the EU to the ECHR – Case
note’, 2 Pécs Journal of International and European Law (2015), pp. 29-36.
82 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, Para. 213.
83 See also Johansen, 2015, pp. 170, 175.
84 See e.g. Ph. Léger (éd.), Commentaire article par article des traités UE et CE, Bâle/Genève/Munich, Helbing
et Lichtenhahn, 2000, pp. 1937-1944 (Art. 307).
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EU law, in accordance with the international law principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec
prosunt. On the other hand, Article 351 TFEUwas crafted to gently and gradually eliminate
conflicting agreements with the founding Treaties.85 As for the first, traditional function
of this treaty provision, the EU Court drew the boundaries of the exception protecting
third parties’ rights in the 2008 Kadi I judgment when it explained that Article 351 TFEU
‘does not applywhen at issue are the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in [the Treaty] as a foundation of theUnion’86
and likewise it ‘may under no circumstances permit any challenges to the principles that
form part of the very foundations of the Community legal order.’87 Thus in the post-Kadi
period, this conflict rule has sharper teeth in protecting the autonomous nature of the EU
legal order than before, allowing for much narrower derogations under primary law via
Member States’ international obligations undertaken before the creation of/accession to
the European Union (or its predecessors). In a similar manner, recent approaches of the
European Commission (e.g. requiring the termination of bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) between EU Member States and third States which are in conflict with EU law)88
point to the same direction. These attempts are about restricting the first function of
Article 351 TFEU (i.e. its non-affection clause character for international obligations
undertaken towards third parties) and stressing its second function, thus shielding the
autonomy of EU law from international law.
3. If we turn our attention to the requirements of preserving the autonomy of EU law
elaborated by the CJEU itself, its jurisprudence is far richer than codified EU law in this
regard. As the EU Court first stressed in Opinion 1/91, then in the MOX Plant and Kadi I
cases, the essential characters of EU powers, the allocation of competences and responsibilities
of institutions defined in the founding Treaties shall be unaltered by subsequent international
agreements. It is interesting to see the evolution of this jurisprudence, slowly but surely
enlarging the scope of those requirements to different kinds of international obligations.
First, in Opinion 1/91 a specific category of international treaties was at stake (the first
version of the EAA Agreement), which contained substantive rules having been almost
identical to norms of Community law and which was meant to transplant some aspects
of the Community model to the international plane as well as to create an international
85 For more on the significance and implications of this treaty provision, see J. Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and
the European Union, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
86 ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, Paras. 301 and 303.
87 ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, Para. 304.
88 See the proposal for a Regulation establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements
between Member States and third countries (COM(2010)344 final, Brussels, 7.7.2010), which aims at, inter
alia, empowering Member States to amend BITs in order to remove incompatibilities with EU law. As for
academic commentaries of the new approach, see e.g. J.P. Terhechte, ‘Article 351 TFEU: The Principle of
Loyalty and the Future Role of the Member States’ Bilateral Investment Treaties’, in Ch. Herrmann and J.P.
Terhechte, (eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2011, Berlin/Heidelberg, Springer,
2011, pp. 79-93.
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(regional) court to supervise that. Similar agreements have then been drafted relating to
the establishment of a European Civil Aviation Area and the European and Community
Patents Courts, both of which triggered Opinions of the CJEU that echoed the same
requirements. A next level was reached with the MOX Plant case, where the treaty at issue
was totally different from the previous international instruments.89 It was a multilateral
treaty of universal character, namely the UNCLOS, to which the European Community
(nowEuropeanUnion) is also a party, alongside withMember States (from the perspective
of the EU treaty practice, this is called a ‘mixed agreement’). This character of theUNLCOS,
however, did not prevent the CJEU from invoking the autonomy of EU law: it first echoed
previous jurisprudence that an ‘international agreement cannot affect the allocation of
responsibilities defined in the Treaties’, then the Court went on concluding that it could
not tolerate the ‘manifest risk that the jurisdictional order laid down in the Treaties and,
consequently, the autonomy of the Community legal system may be adversely affected.’90
4. Finally, in the firstKadi judgment (2008), the judges in Luxemburg further expanded
the eventual scenarios where the external dimension of autonomy comes into play. The
case was peculiar in the sense that neither is the EU amember of the United Nations (UN)
or an addressee of UN Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter (in absence of an international obligation binding the Union), nor was there a
competing jurisdiction of another international court with that of the CJEU. At this time,
it was not actually the need to protect the competences of the institutions, including the
Court’s exclusive jurisdiction from external actors that triggered the recourse to the
‘autonomy argument’, but amore general andmore profound concern for the constitutional
integrity of the EU legal order91 (notably the protection of fundamental rights and the rule
of law, including the judicial review of Union acts in all circumstances by the CJEU). As
a result, autonomy as a constitutional principle is not only opposed to international treaties
and other international obligations binding on the EU, but it was stretched beyond that
circle and is applied to the whole body of international law, regardless of its binding force
on and legal effects towards the European Union. Some commentators assess it extremely
far-reaching,92 even the then Court of First Instance (now General Court) expressed its
scepticism in the 2010 Kadi II decision: ‘the Court of Justice thus seems to have regarded
the constitutional framework created by the ECTreaty as a wholly autonomous legal order,
not subject to the higher rules of international law – in this case the law deriving from the
Charter of the United Nations.’93
89 Also noticed by van Rossem, 2013, p. 16.
90 ECLI:EU:C:2006:345, Paras. 123 and 154.
91 Van Rossem, 2013, p. 17.
92 See e.g. G. de Búrca, ‘The EuropeanCourt of Justice and the International LegalOrderAfterKadi’, 51Harvard
International Law Journal (2010), pp. 1-49; Dubout, 2012, p. 29.
93 Case T-85/09, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. European Commission, Judgment of the General Court (Seventh
Chamber) of 30 September 2010, ECLI:EU:T:2010:418, Para. 119.
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5. Nomatter how far the CJEU seems to have gone, if we get back to the basics in terms
of the origins and existence of the EU legal order, even the position taken by the Court in
Kadi I can be considered logical and somehow necessary. It should be admitted that the
prime rationale behind autonomy of EU law is to separate and distinguish it from interna-
tional law as much as possible. EU law has originally been created within the realm of
international law and the ‘fatherhood’ of the latter can never be denied. EU’s legal archi-
tecture was and still is founded on ordinary international treaties governed by the interna-
tional law of the treaties. The autonomy of the EU legal order represents, using Schilling’s
words, a sort of ‘derivative autonomy’,94 which means the there is another legal order in
relation to which this autonomy is claimed and its degree is assessed. Once it has been set
up, it is independent from the contents of the original legal order i.e. public international
law. By contrast, the autonomous character of the national legal orders goes without saying.
It is uncontested and does not need any justification at all as widespread domestic and
international practice indicates so. Some refer to it as ‘original autonomy’,95 indicating that
the national legal systems are ultimately created by their original constituent powers. They
are ab ovo distinct from each other and, at least from the dualistic point of view, from the
international legal order, too (according to the voluntarist theory, the latter is the creation
of the formers). But owing to the fact that EU law is undeniably rooted in international
law, this quest for autonomywas, naturally, first and foremost directed towards the original
framework of reference, the international legal order, and it resembled a ‘like father like
son’ situation. Summing it up, one can see a full circle here: the more extreme position is
taken by the EUCourt, the more likely this emancipation could effectively be realized and
be endorsed by the international community.
21.3.3 Methods and Requirements to Preserve the Autonomy of EU Law from
the National Legal Orders of Member States
1. Despite the forgoing conclusion, from a conceptual point of view, I submit that the
degree of emancipation of EU law from other legal regimes is tested the best against the
national legal systems. The reason for that is, in my view, that these latter provide the
genuine ‘reality check’ for the autonomous functioning of the EU legal order. If this
emancipation (autonomy) of EU law is accepted by the national legal orders and is reflected
94 T. Schilling, ‘TheAutonomyof theCommunity LegalOrder: AnAnalysis of Possible Foundations’ 37Harvard
International Law Journal (1996), pp. 389-390. Pernice introduced the category of ‘embedded autonomy’
in the context of EU law, highlighting its relative and not absolute character towards both national legal
systems and international law. He submits that ‘it must be open and accommodate […] to normative claims
and limitations originating fromnational constitutions as well as from internationally recognised principles’
(Pernice, 2013, p. 80).
95 Schilling, 1996, p. 389.
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in the practice of domestic institutions (especially courts), we can establish the indispensable
‘rule of recognition’ (as Hart calls it96) with regard to EU law as a self-standing and self-
referential legal order.97The reason behind the prevalence of national law over international
law when assessing the autonomy of EU law originates in its need for effectiveness and
the very purpose of the European integration through law. In the following the principal
arguments will be briefly discussed why national legal orders of the Member States serve
as the best point of reference and constitute the authentic ‘reality check.’
First, although the legal order flowing from the EUTreaties is of supranational charac-
ter,98 its level of operation is primary the domestic legal sphere, aiming at regulating
domestic social, economic and like affairs and private transactions as well. This is also the
very purpose of the European integration, creating a body of lawwhich by its very existence
penetrates into the national legal orders and produces legal effects therein, as well as applied
directly – in parallel with domestic law – by national courts and other authorities.
Secondly, there is a connected phenomenon that the application and implementation
of EU law is mainly carried out by domestic organs.99 Unlike in the United States or in
other federal countries, we cannot talk about executive federalism in the EU context. After
making EU law in a centralized way, that law, in principle, is not enforced by EU agencies
or EU decentralized administrative structures and supranational courts, parallel to those
of the Member States. EU legislation, for its enforcement, essentially relies on the public
administrations and judicial systems of the Member States, who act on behalf of this sui
generis organization, as the ‘agents’ of the European Union when implementing EU law.
As a consequence, autonomy, representing the specific characteristics of this legal order,
cannot be fully enforced in the national context by the EU itself, which does not possess
the tools to do so,mostly due to the relative incompleteness of theUnion judicial system.100
96 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994 (2nd edition), pp. 100-110.
97 Cf., Dubout, 2012, p. 31.
98 For a great overview on supranational law, see e.g. A. Skordas, ‘Supranational Law’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.),
The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 2008-, online edition
(www.opil.ouplaw.com – article last updated: May 2014).
99 For more on this issue, see e.g. A.G. Ibanez, The Administrative Supervision and Enforcement of EC Law.
Powers, Procedures and Limits, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1999.
100 E. Dubout, ‘Le “contentieux de la troisième génération” ou l’incomplétude du système juridictionnel com-
munautaire’, 43 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen (2007), pp. 427-443; Dubout, 2012, p. 34. I concur with
this view notwithstanding the CJEU’s stipulation about ‘the complete system of legal remedies’ under EU
law (Case 294/83, Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. European Parliament, Judgment of the Court of 23April 1986,
ECLI:EU:C:1986:166, Para. 23), which includes effective remedies at the national level, too; considering
national courts to be part of the EU judicial system. However, this dictum concerns first and foremost legal
remedies against the legal acts of the EU institutions and not the review of conformity of domestic judgments
with EU law. Furthermore, in reality, from a sociological point of view, the degree of harmonisation of national
procedures and remedies is not sufficient yet, so the required level of uniformity in the national implemen-
tation of EU law is still lacking, and as a result EU rights could be weakened in the domestic context.
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Thirdly, in the present state of affairs of the European integration process, EU norms
are integrated into the domestic legal orders, thanks to their self-integrating character, and
they maintain very intense and complex, multi-level relations with the national legal sys-
tems, directly addressing individuals etc. As mentioned above, EU law stands for a
‘municipal legal order of trans-national dimensions’, so it endeavours to operate in a
similar manner as domestic legal orders function. So much so that municipal law, with its
tools and legal techniques and doctrines, is a ‘role model’ for EU in various aspects and
represents a great significance for it. This it completely in contrast with the classic approach
of international law, being indifferent to municipal law, which was famously expressed by
the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Case concerning certain German
interests in Polish Upper Silesia: ‘[f]rom the standpoint of International Law […], municipal
laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of States, in the
samemanner as do legal decisions or administrativemeasures.’101This traditional ignorance
holds by no means true for the European Union when it comes to the relevance of
municipal law in the eyes of the EU law.
Lastly, a further factor has made it more challenging for EU law to be recognized by
national laws of Member States as a fully autonomous legal order. This is the so-called
‘original autonomy’ attributed to international law, which is actually questioned by no
one (irrespective of the monism-dualism debate) and which is seen by individual States
as auto-poetic and self-explanatory.102 Despite the ever tangible ‘internationalisation’ of
domestic laws103 and the by nature easier domestic application of some sub-systems of
international law such as international human rights law, trade law or investment law,
international law is still considered, from within the sphere of national legal orders,
somewhat far from everyday socio-legal reality, which only has limited impact in the
municipal law’s empire. It is mainly conceived as something which predominantly plays
a role on the international plane, in traditional inter-State relations. Therefore it has almost
nothing to do neither with the social, economic and other relations within a State; nor
with interactions and legal transactions between private parties. In contrast with that, the
ultimate goal of EU law is to be applied at the national level (this is EU law’s ‘natural
habitat’), both vertically and horizontally, and to produce legal effects in the tissue of
Member States’ legal systems according to its particular techniques of operation. Surely,
domestic legal systems used to be rather reluctant to get used to this ‘interference’ and to
101 Case concerning certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia (The Merits) (Germany v. Poland), Judgment
No. 7, 25 May 1926, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 19, Para. 52. For more, see e.g. C. Santulli, Le statut international
de l’ordre juridique étatique: étude du traitement du droit interne par le droit international, Paris, Editions
A. Pedone, 2001.
102 Dubout, 2012, p. 34.
103 See e.g. M.D. Varella, Internationalization of Law. Globalization, International Law and Complexity.
Berlin/Heidelberg, Springer, 2014.
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accommodate themselves to these needs coming froman ‘alien’ legal order, to the detriment
of their sole imperium.
In my view, all this illustrates pretty well why the recognition of the autonomy of EU
law by Member States was of utmost importance with a view to concretizing this principle
in domestic law and practice.
2. In the following, an overview will be presented about the various methods and
requirements helping to preserve the autonomous nature of EU law from the domestic
legal orders of theMembers States; then I will observe how these requirements differ from
those needed for an effective separation from international law.
Let me start by underlining an important premise, namely that the domestic reception
of EU norms by Member States shall be independent from their doctrinal views (monism
or dualism) and legal techniques used (transformation or adoption) in relation to interna-
tional law.104 EU law might be characterised as a legal system whose norms do prescribe
the domesticmode of interactions (see e.g. direct applicability, direct effect and supremacy),
whereas normally the international legal norms leave themode of reception and interactions
to States. It means that even in Member States which follow a dualist-transformation
practice for the reception of norms of international law origin, secondary EU legislation,
with the entry into force, ipso facto becomes part of the law of the land (self-integrating
character), and no transformation or further incorporation is permitted at all.105
Equally important in this respect is the recognition by Member States of the special
structural features of EU law. However, it should be highlighted that recognizing merely
the specificity of the Union legal order is not enough in itself. A domestic legal order can
recognize the sui generis, even autonomous character of EU law, but nothing prevents it
fromassigningEUnorms a less favorable place in the internal hierarchy of norms, compared
to purely domestic legal rules. In some countries, for instance, this is the case with regard
to international law: the distinct and autonomous nature of international law is far from
being challenged, but still those international norms are ranked inferior to domestic statues,
thus depriving them from their full effectiveness. In other words, the acceptance of the
specific, autonomous character as such is not a guarantee for a desired rank and status in
the internal hierarchy of norms. What is also required is the foundation on which the
recognition is based.106These foundations encompass the traditional structural and consti-
tutional principles of EU law, such as its self-integrating character, supremacy, direct effect
104 See also e.g. D. Simon, ‘Rapport général: Les fondements de l’autonomie du droit communautaire’, in SFDI,
Colloque de Bordeaux. Droit international et droit communautaire, perspectives actuelles, Paris, Editions A.
Pedone, 2000, pp. 236-237.
105 The mere reproduction of the text of regulations in a national Official Gazette is also prohibited, see e.g.
Case 34-73, Fratelli Variola S.p.A. v. Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato, Judgment of the Court of
10 October 1973, ECLI:EU:C:1973:101; Case 272/83, Commission of the European Communities v. Italian
Republic, Judgment of the Court of 28 March 1985, ECLI:EU:C:1985:147.
106 Dubout, 2012, p. 35.
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(both vertical and horizontal), pre-emption, as well as the CJEU’smonopoly of interpreta-
tion of EU law. All those can actually guarantee a privileged standing and are able to make
the concretisation of EU law in social reality happen. The point of view of the organs
charged with the domestic application of EU law is of paramount importance: they choose
under which legal order they classify a given legal norm.
The decentralized application of EuropeanUnion law,mainly through national courts
acting as components of the EU judicial system, entails in itself a major risk of divergent
interpretation and application of EU law in different Member States.107 The CJEU’s
monopoly of authentically interpreting EU law could not work effectively without a
mechanism which formally links national courts as ‘EU courts’ to the ultimate arbitrator
of EU law, the Luxembourg Court. As a consequence, a system of reference to the Court
of Justice of the EU by the national courts was originally set up by the founding Treaties.
This is the procedure regulated in Article 267 TFEU, under which preliminary rulings may
be obtained from the EUCourt, before the referring national court, handling the individual
case, takes its final decision. Thismechanism proved to play a cardinal role in the construc-
tion of the EU legal order andwas of paramount importance for the uniform interpretation
and application if EU law throughout all Member States of the Union. The preliminary
ruling procedure has at least two major functions with the view to preserving the internal
autonomy of EU law. First, it ensures uniformity in the interpretation of EU law in the
domestic context. Variations in interpretation could arise not only between different courts
in a given Member State, but also in the interpretations given to Union law in various
Member States. Such situations would lead to the fragmentation of EU law and could end
up causing structural incoherencies and finally the breakdown of the EU legal system.
Secondly,
the system of preliminary rulings facilities the application of [EU] law by
assisting the national courts in overcoming the difficulties they encounter when
applying [EU] law. If national courts had to apply [EU] law completely by
themselves they might be inclined to shy away from doing so in order to avoid
the difficult problems of applying a legal order unfamiliar to them.108
These functions of the preliminary ruling procedure undoubtedly resonate to the needs
for the autonomous functioning of the EU legal order within the domestic legal systems.
TheCJEU also linked implicitly themechanism set up byArticle 267 TFEU to safeguarding
the autonomous nature of EU law in the Second Rheinmühlen judgment. In the Court’s
107 H.G. Schermers and D. Waelbroeck: Judicial Protection in the European Union, The Hague, Kluwer Law
International, 2001, p. 227 (Para. 446).
108 Schemers and Waelbroeck, 2001, p. 228 (Para. 467).
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view, the preliminary ruling procedure ‘is essential for the preservation of the Community
character of the law established by the Treaty and has the object of ensuring that in all
circumstances this law is the same in all States of the Community.’109This institutionalized
communication and cooperation mechanism between the national jurisdictions and the
CJEU, established by Article 267 TFEU, is therefore indispensable to effectively protect
the specific features of the Union legal order (‘the Community character of the law’) by
ensuring its uniform interpretation and application in the Member States, including the
final say of the EU Court on the validity of the legal acts of the Institutions.110
Further to that,Member States’ belief in the autonomous legal quality of EU law cannot
be neglected either. The crucial element for the actual acceptance of this autonomy is thus
the attitude of the national legislatures, administrations and judiciaries.111 It is nicely
illustrated by the so-called ‘EU’ or ‘integration’ clauses in many national constitutions112
and the self-limitation of some respected constitutional courts in respect of EU law,
including the express recognition of this peculiar and distinct nature of the Union legal
order. National constitutional courts have frequently and consistently treated EU law dif-
ferently from ordinary international treaties and from the decisions of other international
organizations. This situation is quite obvious inMember States using a dualist-transforma-
tion system with regard to international law.113 The Italian Constitutional Court (Corte
costituzionale), back in 1965, had already argued that an alien legal order, such as the law
of the European Coal and Steel Community, is characterized by its own rules; which was
correspondingly recognized with regard to the EEC Treaty in Frontini114 (concluding that
Community norms cannot be considered as sources of international law, neither foreign
law, nor domestic law). Then again in 1984 in the Granital case115 this court ruled that the
Italian and the Community legal orders constitute two autonomous and separated legal
orders. The case law of the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) is
very illustrative as well: suffice to mention the famous Solange I judgment from 1974,116
which adhered to the view ‘that Community law is neither a component part of the national
109 Case 166/73, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, Judgment
of the Court of 16 January 1974, ECLI:EU:C:1974:3, Para. 2.
110 Similarly, see also e.g. Gautron and Grard, 2000, pp. 23-24.
111 For early problems see e.g. J. Mégret, ‘La spécificité du droit communautaire’, 19 Revue internationale de
droit comparé (1967), p. 576.
112 See e.g. Art. 2/A of the former Hungarian Constitution; or Art. E) in the Fundamental Law of Hungary, in
force since 1 January 2012 (in English available at www.kormany.hu/en/news/the-new-fundamental-law-
of-hungary – last accessed on 1 August 2015).
113 Weiler and Haltern, 1996, p. 421 and footnote 44. The sources of the below examples from the three juris-
dictions are Weiler and Haltern, 1996, p. 421, footnote 44; Simon, 2000, pp. 234, 236 and Barents, 2004, pp.
178-179.
114 Corte costituzionale, 27 December 1973 (Guir. Cost., 1973).
115 Corte costituzionale, 18 June 1984 (Guir. Cost., 1984).
116 BVerfGE 37, 271 2 BvL 52/71 Solange I-Beschluß, 29 May 1974.
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legal system nor international law, but forms an independent system of law flowing from
an autonomous legal source.’117 It was confirmed in this ruling that it follows from the
autonomy of the Community legal order that the European Court of Justice is responsible
for controlling the validity of EC law, while as far as their application within the German
legal order is concerned these acts might be subject to the control of the Constitutional
Court. The same approach has been chosen by the FrenchConstitutional Council (Conseil
constitutionnel), too, which stipulated that EU law can be described as an independent
legal order, and not belonging to the institutional structure of the French Republic.118 In
its decision assessing the constitutionality of the (now defunct) Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe (2004), it stated that the French Constitution recognized the
existence of the Community legal order, which is integrated in the domestic legal order
and distinct from the international legal order.119 Likewise, the Hungarian Constitutional
Court (Alkotmánybíróság) had also opined that the founding Treaties and secondary EU
legislation are not considered as international law in the exercise of the its competences,120
and later added that ‘despite its international law origin, the Community legal order is a
sui generis legal order.’121Therefore this apex court also recognized the sui generis character
of EU law and did not assimilate these norms either with international law, or domestic
law. Although it is true that every treaty constituting an international organisation endows
it with certain autonomy122 and creates a somewhat sui generis and ‘autonomous’ internal
law of that organization, the degree of the autonomy of EU law is much higher than that
of any other similar organisation (not to say unprecedented). It explainswhy theHungarian
Constitutional Court has taken this view solely in relation to European Union law (and
not in relation to e.g. the law emanating from theUnitedNations, theNATOor theWTO).
A report prepared by the Registry of the EU Court 20 years ago eloquently summed up
the essence of the above depicted sociological component, which I could not but agree
with: ‘the success of Community law in embedding itself so thoroughly in the legal life of
the Member States is due to its having been perceived, interpreted and applied by the
117 Translation available at https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/case.php?id=588
(last accessed on 1 August 2015).
118 Conseil constitutionnel, Décision no. 92-308 DC du 09 avril 1992, Para. 34.
119 Conseil constitutionnel, Décision no. 2004-505DCdu 19 novembre 2004, Para. 11, quoted by deWitte, 2010,
p. 149.
120 Decision of the Constitutional Court of 1053/E/2005 (16 June 2006), ABH 2006, p. 1828.
121 Decision of the Constitutional Court of 32/2008 (III. 12.) AB (12 March 2008), ABH 2008, p. 325.
122 International Court of Justice, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory
Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Rep. 1996, p. 75: ‘the constituent instruments of international organizations are
also treaties of a particular type; their object is to create new subjects of law endowedwith a certain autonomy’
(emphasis added –T.M.). In the legal literature, consider e.g. R. Collins andN.D.White (eds.), International
Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy. Institutional Independence in the International Legal Order, Oxford,
Routledge, 2011.
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nationals, the administrations and the courts and tribunals of all the Member States as a
uniform body of rules upon which individuals may rely in their national courts.’123
Last but not at least, when the national courts and authorities implement EU law, as
described above, they act in the national legal framework, which may give rise to possible
tensions, with the eventual consequence that applying EU law can become uncomfortable
and might lead to discouraging domestic organs to enforce or give effect to EU norms. In
order to overcome this situation capable of weakening the autonomous character of EU
law, some techniques have been elaborated so as to take into account the essential speci-
ficities of nationals laws, namely the procedural autonomy of Member States (implying the
dual requirement of equivalence and effectiveness) as elaborated by the CJEU124 and the
respect of national (constitutional) identities (as enshrined in Art. 4(2) TEU).125
21.4 Concluding Remarks
After having clarified and explained the different meaning of the external and internal
dimensions of the autonomy of EU law and having discussed its various implications, it
can be observed that these intrinsically linked aspects of autonomy have been in the fore-
front with different intensity throughout various periods of the European integration pro-
cess. Following the foundational times when the external aspect had first been emphasized
in order to parallel claim it internally, towards Member State law, the internal aspect of
the principle become dominant for a while during which EU legal order consolidated and
gotmore robust. Alongwith the constitutionalization of the EU legal order, after the 1990s,
triggered by the EU’s increasing and expanding activities on the international plane, the
external dimension of autonomy was put in the focus in the CJEU jurisprudence and aca-
demic discourse, too; culminating in Opinion 2/13.
In this short overview, apart from understanding the different requirements for pre-
serving the external and internal autonomy, my thesis was that the reason behind the
prevalence of national law over international lawwhen assessing the degree of the autonomy
of EU law can be found in its need for effectiveness and the very purpose of the European
integration through law. To verify this hypothesis, it was necessary to compare the external
123 Report of the Court of Justice on Certain aspects of the application of the Treaty on European Union, May
1995, p. 2; quoted by B. deWitte, ‘Direct Effect, Primacy and the Nature of the Legal Order’, in P. Craig and
G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 193.
124 For a monographic assessment of Member States autonomy when enforcing EU law on the national level,
see B. de Witte and H.W. Micklitz (eds.), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member
States, Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland, Intersentia, 2012.
125 ‘TheUnion shall respect the equality ofMember States before the Treaties as well as their national identities,
inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-
government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the
State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security.’
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and internal aspects of the claimed autonomy in order to demonstrate that the fully-fledged
autonomy of the EU legal order ismore dependent on its relation to the national legal orders
(which is predominantly factual and tangible) than to general international law (which is
rather conceptual, with sporadic contacts between the two through cases before interna-
tional judicial bodies). It is unsurprising in the light of the level of operation of Union law,
which is within the domestic legal orders, and to a much lesser extent on the international
scale (though the expansion of EU external relations shall be acknowledged). It stems from
the above that the real playing field for EU law is the domestic legal sphere of Member
States, therefore this terrain d’arbitrage is regardedmore serious in the eyes of this relatively
‘new legal order’ than the international law governed inter-State relations. Furthermore,
if autonomy is fully recognized by national legal systems and internal actors, it results in
considering EU law as a new kind of legal order, which ‘originality’ separates it not only
from their domestic law, but also from international law. As a consequence, keeping the
validity and application of the EU legal order distinct from the national legal systems builds
up its so-called ‘original autonomy’ (parallel with its transformation into a constitutional
order),126 and this recognition by Member States will indirectly contribute to reinforce its
separateness from international law as well. In other words, one can witness here a ‘two
in one’ scenario. The ‘original autonomy’ of EU law enjoyed vis-à-vis the Member States
will simultaneously and effectively trigger the wider and firm acceptance of the ‘derivative
autonomy’ of the legal order created by the European integration process vis-à-vis interna-
tional law. More than 50 years after its foundation, at a time of consitutionalization of the
supranational public authority called EU, the significance of the concept of autonomy in
the EU legal architecture is not to be underestimated, since this has been coded in its legal
DNA.What is more, according to Kovar expressive wording, ‘[l]’acte fondatuer de l’ordre
juridique de la Communauté a été l’affirmation de sa spécificité et de son autonomie.’127 Let
us hope that in the future more EU and international law scholars will keep an eye on it.
If nothing else, Opinion 2/13 has planted the seeds for prospective academic discourses
on the multifaceted fundamental concept called ‘autonomy of EU law.’
126 See also Weiler and Haltern, 1996, p. 420.
127 R. Kovar, ‘La contribution de la Cour de Justice à l’édification de l’ordre juridique communautaire. Cours
général de droit communautaire’, in Academy of European Law (ed.), Collected Courses of the Academy of
European Law, Florence, European University Institute, 1993, IV/1, p. 25.
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